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THE NATURE OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS, 
MONOTHEISTIC, AND CHRISTIAN 
Keith E. Yandell 
A religious tradition's rational kernel interprets the basic human situation and 
its attendant religious problem, and proffers a solution. Religious faith in-
volves accepting, and living in accord with, a kernel's teachings. If the kernel 
is monotheistic, faith includes trust in God; if a kernel is Christian, it also 
involves trust in Christ. In addition, faith presupposes a certain epistemolog-
ical ambiguity. There must be some evidence that the kernel is false, or at 
least what is such evidence unless one accepts a theory that is based only on 
the kernel itself. 
Introduction 
I offer here an account of the nature of faith, making no pretense to orig-
inality. The suggestion that two inebriated zebras once stood on their rear 
hooves, joined their front hooves, and sang Dixie, thereby creating Heaven 
and Earth, is original. When originality is a view's only virtue, that view has 
virtues numbering less than one. 
Religion 
I take it that a religion is a conceptual system that provides an interpreta-
tion of the world and the place of human beings in it, that rests on that 
interpretation an account of how life should be lived in that world, and that 
expresses this interpretation and lifestyle in a set of rituals, institutions, and 
practices. From the fact that something is an interpretation, it does not follow 
that it cannot be true, or known to be true, or that it is less securely known 
than what is not an interpretation. i 
Rationality and Reasonability 
I use the terms "rational" and "reasonable" here in a restricted way. A 
person who sits in the sand thrashing wildly with her arms and legs in the 
sincere belief that only by doing so will she fend off the dangerous dodo birds 
that threaten her is acting rationally given her beliefs. She assents to Dodoes 
are dangerous, There are dodoes present, and Wild thrashing of one's limbs 
will keep the dodoes at safe distance. She acts wisely in the light of those 
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beliefs-that is, she acts wisely provided she is reasonable in having those 
beliefs, and here she will come up short. So, in the sense of these terms I use 
here, our heroine is rational without being reasonable. If she rightly believes 
that she ·is among white slavers who will stay shy of insane women, she is 
both rational and reasonable. It is a general feature of the various so-called 
world religions that they are rational. Each such religion construes the basic 
human situation, its attendant religious problem, and the cosmos in a certain 
manner, and in the light of these conceptions of humanity, the deepest human 
problem, and the cosmic environment, proffers a solution. This connected 
sequence I will call the rational kernel of a religious tradition. Not to have 
one is not to be a religious tradition. A complete rational kernel is one that 
sufficiently specifies the alleged basic religious problem and its solution so 
that, if the kernel is true, then conditions necessary and sufficient for solving 
the problem the kernel defines are specified in a complete kernel. Religious 
traditions differ in terms of the rational kernels that they proffer. The prop-
ositions contained in a kernel are intended to be distributively and collec-
tively consistent and mutually relevant to stating a basic religious problem 
and a solution to it. If one is assessing a religious kernel, one must ask 
whether it meets these standards. A rational kernel, even one that meets these 
standards, need not be reasonable. The rationality of a kernel is essentially 
an affair internal to the world of thought that the kernel defines. Consider 
that little-known religion Folliculeism which embraces such views as these: 
Sinners almost always have some hair on their heads, as do people who die, 
Removing hair from the head removes all tendency and capacity for sin and 
all weakness to death, Baldness produces sainthood, and Bald persons live 
forever. Folliculeism has a rational kernel, but it enjoys precious little by way 
of reasonability. Of course religious traditions sometimes maintain that real-
ity as it is in itself cannot be captured by concepts. Generally, inadequate 
theories of concepts underlie such claims, and they are not often claims that 
a tradition must make or that occur in the rational kernel of a tradition. 
Reincarnation and Karma 
Four traditions generally accepted as being religious are Jainism, The-
ravada Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, and Christianity. The first 
three are at root Indian religions. Each has its own sacred texts-for Jainism, 
the Jaina Sutras, for Theravada Buddhism, the Pali Canon, for Advaita 
Vedanta, the Vedas and Upanishads and the authoritative commentaries on 
these texts by Badarayanna and others. Advaita Vedanta, at least, consider-
ably qualifies what is meant by reincarnation and karma, but all three of these 
religious traditions begin with reincarnation and karma as assumptions. Per-
sons are born and then die and are again born and then die beginninglessly, 
one's birth conditions into a given lifetime being determined by the right and 
THE NATURE OF FAITH 453 
wrong actions that one performed in previous lifetimes. Right actions bring 
credits and wrong actions bring debits, both of which must be fully paid out. 
The core religious problem is to stop the birth-death process by becoming 
enlightened. The problem of how one can continue to live without accumu-
lating karmic debt or credit after having become enlightened is dealt with by 
the doctrine of interestless action. By performing right actions disinterestedly 
and refraining from wrong actions, the enlightened person can act without 
adding to her karmic record. 
lainism's Rational Kernel 
Iainism holds that the self or person or jiva is an enduring mental substance 
that is inherently immortal. A Iaina text says that ..... modifications cannot 
exist without an abiding or eternal something-a permanent substance. "2 
Persons seem to have limitations regarding dependence that they do not have, 
and while embodied they have limitations that they would not have were they 
unembodied. By attaining an esoteric state of enlightenment-kevala-one 
can see that dependence limitations are illusory and the limitations on knowl-
edge and power are escapable. Thus in the IAINA SUTRAS one reads that 
when the Venerable Ascetic Mahavira had become enlightened, he was "om-
niscient and comprehending all objects; he knew and sawall conditions of 
the world, of gods, men, and demons: whence they come, whither they go, 
whether they are born as men or animals ... or become gods or hell-be-
ings ... the ideas, the thoughts of their minds, the food, doings, desires, the 
open and secret deeds of all living beings in the whole world; he the Arhat, 
for whom there is no secret, knew and sawall conditions of all living beings 
in the world, what they thought, spoke, or did at any moment."3 Occasionally 
it is claimed that one who reaches kevala even learns that one is omnipotent; 
at any rate, one learns that one is omniscient and dependent for one's exis-
tence on nothing external to oneself. The same SUTRAS say of the soul that 
"since it possesses no corporeal form, it is eternal" [IS II, 64]. This is not a 
variety of monotheism. Nor does it posit an identity between the soul and 
quality less Brahman. Another text says that "Liberation is the freedom from 
all karmic matter, owing to the non-existence of the cause of bondage and to 
the shedding of the karmas. After the soul is released, there remain perfect 
right-belief, perfect right-knowledge, and the state of having accomplished 
all." Personal identity is retained in enlightenment [RM, 260]. Thus we have 
a rational kernel that goes something like this: all unenlightened persons are 
embodied and will remain embodied so long as they perform wrong actions 
or even perform right actions with interest. One result is that while they 
actually are ontologically independent and secure, they appear to themselves 
and others to be dependent and fragile. Another result is that while in prin-
ciple they have great knowledge and power, they seem to be relatively igno-
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rant and weak. A life lived in accord with strict regulations and meditative 
practices, combine4 with a full acceptance of Jain teachings, can lead to an 
enlightenment experience called kevala in which one realizes one's true na-
ture. Achieving this experience guarantees that the death of the current body 
of the enlightened person will not be followed by another embodiment and 
the person will live unembodied in full exercise of his or her powers and with 
full retention of personal identity. 
Theravada Buddhism's Rational Kernel 
A Buddhist text says that ~Nagasena [or any other proper name] is but a 
way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name for 
the hair of my head, hair of my body ... brain of the head, form, sensation, 
perception, the predispositions and consciousness. But in the absolute sense 
there is no ego" [RM, 284]. On this view, a person is only a collection of 
elements, each element momentary and transitory; the same holds for a phys-
ical object. At a moment, a person is but a heap of momentary states; over 
time, a person is but a series of such heaps that occur in causal chains. There 
is no atman or jiva or enduring self, as in Jainism, nor is there an unchanging 
ultimate Brahman, as in Advaita Vedanta. Thus one reads that ~Misery only 
doth exist, none miserable. No doer is there; naught save the deed is found. 
Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks this. That path exists, but not the 
traveller on it."4 Again, ~the word 'chariot' is but a name for pole, axle, 
wheels, chariot-body, and banner staff ... (the proper name) 'Nagasena' is but 
a ... mere name for the hair of my head, brain of the head, form, sensation, 
perception, the predispositions, and consciousness. But in the absolute sense 
there is no ego to be found" [BT, 125]. In nirvana, it is said, one learns this 
truth concerning impermanence, and final nirvana is the cessation of even 
this transitory self with consequent cessation also of all desire. All of human 
life, however superficially satisfying or enjoyable, is inherently unsatisfac-
tory; the retention of identity as a person is retention of an unsatisfactory life, 
because to be a person is to have unfulfilled desires. Nirvana alone is change-
less. By living according to the requisite regulations and following meditative 
techniques, and accepting Buddhist teachings, the enlightenment state nir-
vana may be reached. The occurrence of this state in a series of heaps guar-
antees that at the cessation of this series no further series will be engendered; 
thus the reincarnation history of this series of heaps ends. 
Advaita Vedanta's Rational Kernel 
Advaita Vedanta is one of three main schools of Vedantic Hinduism; the 
other two are monotheistic. According to Advaita Vedanta there is an ultimate 
and independent reality that is apersonal. To say that God is infinite is not, 
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as in monotheistic contexts, to say that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and 
morally perfect. Rather, it is to say that everything is divine. For monothe-
ism, "infinite" is an adjective, and to speak of "the Infinite" is to raise the 
question "the Infinite what?" For Advaita Vedanta, "the Infinite" is a noun 
referring to Brahman. Persons seem to be enduring mental substances, and 
the objects of sensory perception seem to be enduring physical substances. 
This indeed is how they are to be viewed unless we turn to the level of 
Reality. Then the truth is that each Atman or enduring self is identical to 
Brahman; "Thou art that." The basic religious problem is ignorance-taking 
appearance to be Reality. Escape from this ignorance requires that one attain 
moksha, an esoteric experience in which it is alleged that no subject/con-
scious/object or subject/object distinction can be made. Personal identity 
obviously is not retained in one's solving one's religious problem; indeed, 
strictly personal identity is viewed as always illusory and you cannot retain 
what you never had. Achieving moksha requires a life disciplined by Advaita 
rules of conduct and by learning Advaita philosophy. An Advaita Vedanta 
text tells us that" ... the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the 
(real) self does not belong to this transmigratory world ... There prevails the 
false notion that the Lord (Le., Brahman) and the transmigrating soul are 
different" [RM, 513]. My comments, in effect, constitute an attempt to 
explain this passage. 
Christianity's Rational Kernel 
The rational kernel of Christianity asserts that the world was created by, 
and depends for its existence on, an omnicompetent and holy Creator and 
Providence who has to at least to some degree make His will known to us. 
In turn, we have acted against what we knew to be right, and are hence 
sinners. It would manifest neither divine holiness nor divine love for God 
simply to overlook our sins, which can be forgiven only on the objective 
basis of a divinely provided atonement and the subjective basis of our re-
pentance. Thus God became incarnate in Jesus Christ who died for our sins 
and was raised for our justification. Hence "repentance toward God and faith 
in our Lord Jesus Christ" solves the basic religious problem, the need for 
forgiveness of sin and for restoration to right standing before a holy God 
who then both forgives our sins and frees us for a life of service to Himself 
and other persons that also fulfills our human nature as created in the divine 
image. 
Comparison 
It may aid comprehension if we compare and contrast our Indian traditions. 
For Advaita Vedanta, there is a distinction between the apparent self and the 
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real; one cannot escape transmigration without knowing the nature of this 
distinction-namely that the real self is identical with quality less Brahman. 
For Jainism, there is a distinction between the way the self appears regarding 
knowledge and dependence and the way the self is regarding knowledge and 
dependence; we are omniscient and independent, and one cannot escape trans-
migration without knowing this. For Theravada, we tend to believe that there 
is an enduring ego or self, and there is none; one cannot escape transmigration 
without knowing this. If one looks at the accounts we have given of four 
religious traditions, it is clear that they include claims about at least two sorts 
of matters: what there is, or metaphysics, and what there ought to be, or 
ethics. I will briefly draw out some of the metaphysical, and some of the 
moral, claims that are constitutive of these religious traditions. In the Chris-
tian tradition, experience and doctrine both emphasize the role of a Creator 
and Providence on whom all else depends. Between God and any human 
person there is a one-way dependence relationship; it is blasphemous to deny 
the Creator-creature distinction. For Advaita Vedanta, what seems to be crea-
ture really is, not strictly the Creator, but at any rate underived Being. Crea-
turehood, sin, forgiveness, and the Divine Person as well, are illusory; all 
there is, is quality less and apersonal Brahman. Jainism ascribes to each per-
son, as he or she really is as opposed as to how he or she seems to be, the 
independence of everything else that Christianity ascribes to God alone. It 
denies that there is any Creator, but denies as well that personal individuality 
is illusory or should or even could be lost in a sea of quality less being. The 
Theravadin accepts neither God nor the Jain substantial soul, maintaining that 
all there is, is transitory save for Nirvana itself, the attaining of which in-
volves not only the cessation of desire but the cessation of individuality. In 
one sense, of course, setting aside the deep problems with such a notion, 
being identical to a qualityless and so apersonal Brahman and being absorbed 
into an apersonal state does not give one much to choose between, and some 
of his Vedantic critics accused Shankara of being a crypto-Buddhist. However 
one should decide the question of the identity of the Advaita Vedanta Brah-
man and the Theravada Nirvana, it is clear that at the least ultimate reality 
is conceived quite differently in Christianity and Jainism and Advaita Vedanta 
and Theravada. So is the nature and status of human beings. There is not 
identity of content here. It is false that all religions are doctrinally the same. 
In a way, this makes what they do agree on all the more interesting. 
Some Common Religious Claims 
Our four religious traditions agree on such claims as these: human life is 
not limited to three-score-and-ten years on this earth; nothing that we can 
lose is of ultimate value; pleasure is not the ultimate good; violence is not 
an end in itself; there is a correct description of our actual cosmic situation, 
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our consequent basic religious problem, and its real and accessible solution; 
some actual religious tradition has the truth about these matters; it is foolish 
to live only for power or pleasure or wealth. These are not obvious or trivial 
truths; plenty of people would reject, say, more than three of these claims. It 
plainly is worth noting that at least our four religious traditions share these 
themes. These traditions share an emphasis on doctrinal knowledge that is 
more important for present purposes. The New Testament contains such pas-
sages as that in which Jesus says "I am the Way, the nuth, and the Life; no 
one comes to the Father but by me" [John 14:6]. One reads that "He who 
believes in the Son has eternal life; he who does not obey the Son shall not 
see life, but the wrath of God abides on him" [John 3:36]. Peter asserted 
"There is salvation in no one else [but Jesus Christ], for there is no other 
name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" [Acts 
4: 12]. It is less well known that the other religious traditions we have dis-
cussed have similar emphases. Shankara, for example, forthrightly says that 
"If the soul... is not considered to possess fundamental unity with Brahman-
an identity to be realized by knowledge-there is not any chance of its 
obtaining final release. "5 A Jain text bluntly tells us that "Those who do not 
know all things by kevala (knowledge), but who being ignorant teach a law 
(of their own), are lost themselves, and work the ruin of others in this dread-
ful, boundless Circle of Births. Those who know all things by the full Kevala 
knowledge, and who are practicing meditation and teach the whole law, are 
themselves saved and save others" [JS, I, 265, 266, 271]. A Buddhist text 
speaks plainly to this effect: "If one does not proceed in this manner [to 
"proceed in this manner" is to "develop the understanding which results from 
the study of the (Buddhist) teachings,"] inasmuch as meditation on some 
erroneous idea cannot even clear away doubt, recognition of reality will not 
arise and consequently meditation will be profitless like that of the Tirthikas 
(i.e., non-Buddhists, especially Jains)."6 The theme of these passages is clear 
enough. To put them in one jargon: there is a heaven to gain and a hell to 
shun. This insistence on the importance of doctrine comes out in another way. 
It is not an accident that the experiences that are religiously central to our 
Indian traditions are typically called enlightenment experiences; they are 
described as cugnitive. An Advaitin description of moksha goes like this: 
"When a seer sees ... the Brahman-source, then, being a knower, shaking off 
good and evil, stainless, he attains supreme identity with Him" [MUNDAKA 
UPANISHAD, III, i, 3, 8]. The JAINA SUTRAS speak of "the highest knowl-
edge and intuition, called Kevala" and "the highest knowledge and intuition, 
called Kevala, which is ... finalliberation" [JS, II, 418]. A Theravada text says 
that "The monk life leads to complete detachment, to freedom from desire, 
to cessation, to peace, to superknowledge, to the highest insight, to nibbana" 
[DIGHA NIKAYA II, 251]. Correspondingly, the New Testament says that 
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"We know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding so 
that we may know Him who is true" [I John 5:20]. It is worth noting and 
emphasizing that these passages are not simply exceptions that do not deeply 
reflect the perspectives we have been discussing. They typically describe the 
experiences that are regarded within their traditions as salvifically necessary 
and sufficient. 
Summary 
I have noted that a religion typically offers an account of the conditions in 
which we exist, a conception of the religious problem that we face because 
of existing in those conditions, and a solution that is viewed as realistically 
facing and resolving that problem under those conditions. Different religions 
see those conditions differently. They hence describe the basic religious 
problem differently. They therefore offer different solutions. It is in the very 
nature of religion to offer an account of our situation, our problem, and its 
solution. Not every problem can arise in every situation; not every problem 
has the same solution. The account of our problem depends on the account 
of our situation. The recipe for our salvation depends on what we are and 
what we need to be saved from. To accept a religion is to embrace some 
particular and connected account of the religious situation and problem and 
solution. 
Some Kinds of Morality 
The highest good for Advaita Vedanta is attained by achieving moksha, for 
Jainism by achieving kevala, for Theravada by achieving nirvana. These 
traditions recognize a distinction between experience had now that guarantees 
later escape from the Wheel, and post-mortem liberation. They hold that the 
highest good we can have in this life is achieving experiences that guarantee 
liberation at death. A key question in understanding how liberation is under-
stood is this: is personal identity retained in enlightenment? The Advaita 
answer and the Theravada answer, for different reasons, is negative; the Jain 
answer is positive. All other values in these traditions serve as means to the 
end of enlightenment. In a tradition in which persons do not survive into 
enlightenment, persons cannot themselves have intrinsic value or inherent 
worth. So they lack such worth in Advaita Vedanta and Theravada, and 
possess it in Jainism. They possess it also in Christianity. In Jainism, persons 
owe none of their worth as persons to God; in Christianity persons owe all 
of their worth as persons to God. In these ways, differences in concepts of 
moral worth correspond to differences in metaphysics. Our four traditions 
deeply differ in their morality in the ways noted; they embrace different, and 
importantly incompatible, values. rno religious traditions are functionally 
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identical only if their basic values-what they take to have inherent or in-
trinsic worth-are similar, for the lifestyles that religions sanction are func-
tions of the intrinsic values they embrace. Hence our traditions are not 
functionally identical. 
Propositional Faith 
Religious kernels comprise certain propositIOns. Obviously, to accept a 
religious tradition involves at least affirming its rational kernel. If we want 
a notion of religious faith that cuts across traditions, then, perhaps this is a 
minimum: Raji has religious faith if and only if there is some religious 
tradition such that Raji accepts its rational kernel. To accept a rational kernel 
is to believe its constituent propositions. To have propositional faith is to 
believe some religious tradition's rational kernel. It is not therefore to sup-
pose that the kernel that is believed meets the standards mentioned above, or 
is reasonable to believe, or the like. It is simply to take a kernel to be true. 
Kernels and History 
Judaism of any recognizably orthodox variety rests on God having called 
out a people. Abraham and Moses, David and the prophets, form part of a 
history to which the tradition appeals. The receiving of the Law and the 
Exodus from Egypt play central roles in that history. Which claims are es-
sential and which can be sacrificed without deep religious loss is not some-
thing to be weighed here, but not all of the history can go without a change 
occurring that amounts to transmogrification. Without historical claims, there 
is no Christian kernel. The Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection all 
presuppose (that is, entail) the reality of Jesus as an historical person who 
died and was buried. [If P presupposes Q, then if Q is false, P is false. But 
if P's falsehood follows from Q's falsehood, then (by conversion) Q's truth 
follows from P's truth. But then P entails Q.] SO some religious kernels 
contain historical claims as essential elements. It is doubtful that all religious 
kernels contain historical claims-claims to the effect that particular persons 
were involved in particular events-that play an essential as opposed to an 
important role. If the Buddha never existed, then the teachings ascribed to 
him were not those of a man who had become enlightened; one will be left 
to find out oneself whether they are true or not without being able to rely on 
a pathfinder. That is inconvenient, but not catastrophic. But if a divine atone-
ment must be provided through the death of a human person who is God 
Incarnate, and such a person has not existed, then no atonement is available. 
The differences among religious traditions in this regard are deep and fasci-
nating. But it is not our topic here, and I simply note its importance. 
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Monotheistic Faith 
Suppose that Raji accepts the rational kernel of a monotheistic religious 
tradition. It is plain that this is not sufficient for Raji to have monotheistic 
faith. '!\vo Biblical texts come to mind. One is to the effect that "He who 
comes to God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those 
that diligently seek Him" [Hebrews 11:6]. The other tells us that "The devils 
believe and tremble" [James 2:19]. The former text suggests that Raji has 
met one condition for having monotheistic faith. The other suggests that this 
necessary condition is not sufficient. 
Propositional Faith and Practical Faith 
On the account offered here, a necessary condition of someone's having 
religious faith relative to some religion R is that one take the rational kernel 
of religion R to be true-that one believe it in a sense of "believe" in which 
S believes that P entails neither S knows that P nor S does not know that P. 
That condition is not sufficient. 
A further necessary condition is that one practice the religion in question. 
The notion of "practicing" a religion is not lucid and deserves an essay on 
its own. But the rough idea is clear enough for our purposes. What it is to 
practice a religion depends on what religion it is one is or is not practicing. 
One practices a religion by believingly participating in the rites and rituals, 
and thereby usually the institutions, of that religion. A monotheist confesses 
sins to God and repents and asks for forgiveness; a monotheist worships God 
and thanks God for life, friends, family, and daily bread. A Theravada Bud-
dhist monk meditates, endeavors to understand the Pali canon, abstains from 
alcohol and sex, and seeks enlightenment. A Theravada Buddhist lay person 
follows a less stringent regimen and supports the tradition's monks, hoping 
in a later life to seek enlightenment. 
It is possible to practice a religion and yet often fail to meet its standards. 
A monotheist practices her faith when she resists temptation, but also when 
she confesses and repents her failures to resist. The Theravada Buddhist 
practices his religion not only when he obeys the religion's precepts but also 
when, having disobeyed them, he recognizes his sufferings as the outworking 
of his karma, and thus as deserved. The typical Old Testament atheist is not 
one who denies the propositions of the rational kernel of Jewish orthodoxy, 
but one who does not live in the light cast by that kernel-who lives as if 
there was no God. Sheer formal assent to the existence of God and to Torah 
as God's law does not make one a Jew. Thinking that the Apostle's Creed 
contains only truths does not make one a Christian. Taking the Pali canon as 
correct doctrine does not make one a Theravada Buddhist. To belief one must 
add practice; to propositional faith one must add practical faith. 
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Personal Faith 
So far as the non-monotheistic religions are concerned, that seems to me 
to be the whole story, so long as we allow that a good deal more could be 
said about both propositional faith and practical faith. Practical faith without 
propositional faith is blind and propositional faith without practical faith is 
empty. Together, they are sufficient for religious faith in any non-monothe-
istic religion. Monotheistic rational kernels contain propositions that are true 
only if God exists. If God exists, then an omnicompetent Person exists. If one 
has monotheistic faith, one trusts that Person. One takes that Person to will 
only good to oneself and others (allowing for some possibly discomforting 
difference of view between Object and subject of trust on what is good for 
oneself). One worships God, not only as powerful, but as good. One confesses 
one's sin and commits one's life to God. Then one has personal faith-trust 
in another person whose ontological situation is unique. It is possible to 
accept a monotheistic rational kernel and not practice it. It is possible to 
believe a monotheistic rational kernel and formally practice it without any 
trust in God. Monotheistic propositional faith plus monotheistic practical 
faith is still empty without monotheistic personal faith. Christian monotheis-
tic personal faith includes trust in the Son as God Incarnate as well as in God 
the Father. 
Faith and Reason 
In the terms previously used, religious faith, monotheistic faith, and Chris-
tian faith, are inherently rational. Whether Christian faith is reasonable or not 
is another matter. Reasonability is relative to evidence; possession of evi-
dence varies from person to person, and for the same person from one time 
to another. Insofar as "faith and reason" is a rubric for raising questions 
concerning the reasonability of faith, obviously it breaks into as many ques-
tions as there are religious rational kernels. Let propositional, practical, and 
(if appropriate given R's content) personal faith that R be simply R-faith. The 
question "Is R-faith reasonable?" itself breaks down into various questions. 
It may be the question as to whether R-faith is reasonable, given the relevant 
data now available to the average adult U.S. citizen. It may instead be the 
question as to whether Sharon Hale's faith is reasonable-that is, whether 
Sharon is reasonable in having R-faith, given what she knows. That question 
may (but may not) have a different answer than whether, say, the Pope's 
R-faith is reasonable. Such questions of reasonability are relative to ranges 
of data. A question of the form Is S's R-faith reasonable? necessarily is 
elliptical for Is S's R-faith reasonable, given S's relevant data base? (perhaps 
with reference to what S should know). A question of the form Is R-faith 
reasonable? is elliptical for Is R-faith reasonable, relative to data base D? 
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Obviously, answers to such questions may well differ given different ranges 
of data. Of course no objectionable relativism is involved in this, and what 
is true of an R-faith in this regard is also true of believing a scientific theory, 
historical narrative, or literary reconstruction. Obviously it is logically pos-
sible that two people agree that a given base contains only certain data and 
disagree about whether some R-faith is reasonable, given that data. Whether 
one of the parties to such a dispute must be wrong is an interesting issue that 
I will not explore here. One of the less objectionable grounds for suggesting 
that faith ought not to overly rely on reason is that if one tries always to 
believe in accord with what is reasonable at the time, one's beliefs are not 
likely to undergo constant fluctuations. Since if one has an R-faith, it is likely 
to pervasively affect one's life, one's equanimity and perhaps one's psycho-
logical stability will be ill served by such fluctuations. One might call this 
problem, or set of problems, the uncertainty factor. The propositional faith 
that Christian faith involves is not different in kind or degree from that 
involved in being a devout materialist. A devout materialist embraces such 
claims as Nothing exists save physical things, properties of physical things, 
and relations between physical things and To be physical is a matter of 
corresponding to the basic concepts of contemporary physics. Thus a New-
tonian materialist holds a different sort of materialism than does an 
Einsteinean materialist, and it is not unlikely that the future holds various 
other types, as does the past. There is always the epistemic possibility that 
today's Nature contain news of a revolution in basic physical concepts. In 
addition, there is the epistemic possibility that today's Mind (which, as Julius 
Weinberg used to point out, for years arrived in this country marked "Second 
Class Matter") contains an article by a dualist, an idealist, or a critical mate-
rialist refuting the latest version of materialism, and doing so in such a way 
as to make materialist revision seem improbable. The common confidence 
that this will not happen seems largely to rest on the assumption that somehow 
science carries materialism along with it, and I confess to thinking this the 
particle board of wishful thinking covered by the veneer of current fashion. 
Insofar as the materialist cuts the cloth of her ethic to the sail of her meta-
physic, and otherwise requires that her social science and epistemology and 
aesthetics and so on are all rendered consistent with their status as based on 
a materialist metaphysic, the result is a very complex view of things by no 
means unlikely to be wrong at various points and possibly wrong at its core. 
Idealists and dualists continue to flourish and offer arguments, some of which 
are very interesting and powerful. Already the more plausible forms of ma-
terialism look rather unmaterialistic if viewed from the perspectives of a 
Lucretius or a Hobbes. Perhaps [what will appear to a materialist as] worse 
is to come. In a word, then, any worldview is likely to be epistemically a bit 
"iffy" -subject to new criticisms, faced with new versions of old problems, 
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underdetermined by its supporting evidence, and in other ways unpleasing to 
one on a quest for certainty. In such matters lies the inadequate rationale of 
both those who speak of faith in connection with the acceptance of any 
metaphysic whatever and those who revel in relativism. It is not my purpose 
here to solve any philosophical problems that are involved in the uncertainty 
factor in the midst of an essay on religious faith. Such problems, if any, arise 
in connection with accepting any worldview, though of course in the case of 
a monotheistic worldview issues of personal trust join those of propositional 
faith and practical faith. It is enough for my purposes here to point this out, 
and to note that the existence of the uncertainty factor is no objection to the 
account of faith being offered. Indeed, it may be that the uncertainty factor 
not only is no objection to the account of faith offered here, but is essential 
to it. If, as I suspect, a certain objection is correct, one who defends the view 
of faith being offered here must examine more closely the sources of the 
uncertainty factor. 
An Objection 
The account of Christian faith developed here has not insignificant advan-
tages. Consider a variety of things that the Bible says about faith. Faith can 
be broken or kept. It can be, or fail to be, firm. It can be little or great. It can 
be confessed. One can be obedient, or disobedient, to faith. One can turn from 
it or remain true to it. One can be purified by faith. Obedience can come from 
it. Those who have faith are justified, credited as righteous. If one believes 
what is false, one's faith is futile. The content of faith is provided by the 
Faith once delivered. Its object is God or Christ. Not everyone has faith. It 
can be sincere or insincere. One can deny it. One can be brought up in the 
truths of the Faith. One can act by faith and understand by faith. Faith without 
works is dead. Faith is not hope or love or goodness, but these can be added 
to it. The only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through love. While 
I leave doing so as an exercise for the reader, I suggest that an account of 
faith that weaves together the strands of propositional faith, practical faith, 
and personal faith fits these comments nicely. Nonetheless, it is open to an 
objection. While it also fits nicely the notion that one who would come to 
God must believe that God exists and that God is a rewarder of those that 
diligently seek Him, and perhaps is adequate to the teaching that faith is the 
substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, nothing 
in it adequately reflects the difference expressed by the suggestion that we 
see in a glass darkly, but then face to face or that now we know in part, but 
then we shall know even as we are known. Our analysis is too antiseptic to 
accommodate a deep faith-versus-sight contrast. I accept the critique. The 
interesting question is how to deal with it. The account of faith offered here 
does not lack any essential internal element. It merely fails to specify the sort 
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of context in which faith is an option. The defect hence is external and 
remediable by specifying the relevant external setting. This is no easy task. 
Psychological Sight 
One too-easy way of saying what the setting requires is this: God could 
make it impossible to doubt His existence, goodness, and the like. Were God 
to do so, one might suggest, then faith would be impossible. What one might 
call psychological sight would be inevitable. Essentially, this notion of sight 
is negative rather than positive, and it deals with psychology not evidence. 
One may doubt whether what brainwashing might produce really is a variety 
of the sight which to possess is better than having faith. 
Sight As Lack of Underdetermination 
A different notion of sight appeals to the Beatific Vision, interpreted so as 
to remove evidential underdetermination. An attractive suggestion (both non-
psychological and relevant to evidence) is that religious faith must occur in 
a context in which the religious kernel in question is underdetermined by 
evidence-by experiential evidence, or total evidence, or total available ev-
idence, or the like. The contrasting sight is comprised by propositional, prac-
tical and personal faith that occur in a context in which evidence for the 
relevant religious kernel is not evidentially underdetermined (and the posses-
sor of sight knows this). Thus one might try something like this: (U) Propo-
sition P is evidentially underdetermined by experience E under description 
D if and only if D can be true of E's phenomenology and P be false. Expe-
riences are evidence only under some description. the proposition My dog is 
beside me is evidentially underdetermined by any experience I can have, 
including that of seeing and feeling my dog beside me, since I can have an 
experience with an I-see-and-feel-my-dog-beside-me phenomenology and yet 
the indicated proposition be false. We can add: (U 1) Proposition P is eviden-
tially underdeterminedl by experience E if and only if it is logically possible 
that some experience E1 occur such that E1 is veridical and if E1 is veridical 
then E is not. Then being evidentially underdetermined by experience entails 
being experientially defeasible. Again, we can add: (U2) Proposition P is 
evidentially underdeterminecP by experience E if and only if E comprises 
simple observation of X and "P is true" entails "X has property A " and no 
one can confirm by simple observation that X has A. Then, where simple 
observation is observation that is innocent of theory, being evidentially un-
derdetermined by experience entails being evidentially supportable only by 
experiences that include theory-laden observations. Yet again, we can add: 
(U3) Proposition P is evidentially underdeterminecP by experience E if and 
only if "P is true" entails "Theory T is true" and for any description D such 
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that "E is veridical under D" supports "P is true" it is false that "D is true of 
E" entails "T is true." Then being probabilistically supported by experiential 
evidence entails being underdetermined by experiential evidence. Finally, let 
us say that to be experientially underdetermined is to be experientially un-
derdetermined in one or more of the ways specified by (U) through (U3), and 
we have the beginnings of an understanding of the suggestion being can-
vassed. It is not clear that even a Beatific Vision would not be evidentially 
underdetermining with regard to monotheism, or indeed that any set of ex-
periential evidence would not be underdetermining regarding monotheism 
(or, for that matter, any competing theory). Doubt can be removed by omni-
competent fiat. Reasonable belief can be made possible by evidence created 
by omnicompetent fiat. But it is epistemically possible that it is logically 
impossible that any experience or experiences occur that do not evidentially 
underdetermine God exists, including the Beatific Vision. I do not know 
whether devotees of talk of a Beatific Vision would be disturbed by this 
epistemic possibility turning out to be realised. If it is realised, then presum-
ably no world can be created in which monotheism is not evidentially un-
derdetermined by whatever experiences occur in it. At any rate, this will be 
so if the Beatific Vision is as good as pro-theistic experiential evidence gets. 
If a world's being experientially evidentially underdetermined regarding the-
ism is essential to faith being possible in a world, and a world's being expe-
rientially evidentially underdetermined regarding theism precludes the sort 
of sight that is incompatible with faith being available in a world, then on 
the account just presented, sight is always precluded, and faith is always 
possible, in any world one pleases in which the evidence for theism is expe-
riential. Even if that is so, one deeply attracted by the suggestion that it is 
evidential underdetermination that makes faith possible can switch our atten-
tion to all of our evidence, experiential and otherwise, suggesting (for exam-
ple) that there are possible worlds in which a sound and valid argument is 
accessible to its inhabitants that meets something like these conditions: (i) 
none of its premises by itself entails God exists, (ii) God exists is the conclu-
sion of the argument, (iii) no premise of the argument is evidentially un-
derdetermined by its supporting evidence, and (iv) whatever support is 
required for any of the premises of this argument escapes being evidentially 
underdetermined at any point. Call an argument that meets conditions (i-iv) 
a monotheistic surety argument. The idea, then, is that a world in which a 
monotheistic surety argument is, say, as widely accepted as such claims as 
"Fire bums" and "Water is wet" is a world in which faith is impossible. The 
suggestion at hand is correct only if there exists a monotheistic surety argu-
ment. Whether there is such an argument or not, "in" any possible world, is 
not obvious. Hence it is not obvious that the suggestion is correct. Further, 
perhaps such an argument would render propositional faith inevitable; but 
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that of course hardly entails that it makes faith impossible. Full-fledged 
monotheistic faith includes personal as well as practical faith, and since these 
can be absent when propositional faith is present, it is not clear that the 
presence of a monotheistic surety argument would render either personal or 
practical faith either inevitable or impossible. A quite different suggestion, 
that I will only mention, is that if personal faith is to be possible, it must be 
logically possible that God act wrongly-it is incoherent to have faith that a 
necessary truth is true or to trust that a necessarily existing person has the 
essential properties that it possesses or that a necessarily existing person will 
act in accord with properties that it necessarily cannot not act in accord with. 
One can have faith that P only if it is logically possible that not-P as well as 
logically possible that P. One can trust a person to do A only if it is logically 
possible that the person not do A as well as logically possible that she do A. 
Roughly, a condition of faith on this view is that if God has essential moral 
goodness then God lacks logically necessary existence, or that God is a moral 
agent and thus has Kantian freedom of action (the sort of freedom that Kant 
himself ascribes to human agents but not to God). The obvious counter-sug-
gestion will be to say that there are conditions in which one cannot tell that 
a proposition is necessarily true or that a person necessarily exists and nec-
essarily will (or will not) act in a certain way, and in those cases having the 
relevant propositional faith and personal trust is possible. A condition of 
faith, then, on this view is that the faithful have a certain lack of logical 
perspicuity. 
A Different Response: Theodic Indeterminacy 
1 am inclined to think that the following response, or something like it, is 
the right one to make to the objection we have been considering. Its core 
notion is that of theistic neutrality. Strictly, its core notion is that of theodic 
neutrality, which is (I suppose) but one sort of theistic neutrality. The crucial 
difference between theistic neutrality (whether it has only the one variety 1 
will discuss here, or also others) and underdetermination is that whether or 
not the latter can be overcome by evidence, the former can be. Perhaps, then, 
what makes faith possible is not merely that any experiences we have will 
evidentially underdetermine monotheism. Perhaps there must also be cases 
in which there are events that are theodically neutral. A theodically neutral 
event is an event such that it is a member of both the class (i) events God is 
wrong to permit without having a morally sufficient reason, and the class (ii) 
events regarding which we are unable to think of what a plausible morally 
sufficient reason for permitting them might be. Events that fall into this 
second class fall also into one or the other of these classes: (iia) evils such 
that it is not apparent what morally sufficient reason God could have for 
allowing them, (iib) evils such that it is apparent that God could have no 
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morally sufficient reason for allowing them. If it is apparent what morally 
sufficient reason God could have for allowing an evil, then let us say that 
that evil is morally lucid. Events that fall into (ii) also fall into (iib) if it is 
true that (A) An event is one that God could have a morally sufficient reason 
for allowing only if that event is morally lucid. In fact, (A) is false and events 
in (ii) fall also into (iia) without having to do so by way of first falling into 
(iib). If an event falls into (iia) rather than falling into (iib), as opposed to 
falling into (iib) and thus also falling into (iia), and falls as well into (i) and 
(ii), then it is a theodically neutral event. X falls into (Ub) entails X falls into 
(iia), but not conversely. My general suggestion is that faith is possible in a 
world in which theodically neutral events are known to occur. This suggestion 
must be complicated a bit. Assume that (B) If any event falls into (iib) then 
God does not exist. Distinguish between events that do not fall into (iib) but 
that we somehow have reason to think do so, and events that we somehow 
have reason to think fall into (iib) and actually do so. Let the former events 
be epistemic (Ub) events and the latter sort of events be metaphysical (iib) 
events. A world in which there are epistemic (iib) events or metaphysical 
(iib) events is a world in which faith is possible. There might, or might not, 
be protheistic evidence in such a world, and that evidence might or might not 
be enough to balance or outweigh the evidence in favor of there being epi-
stemic or metaphysical (iib) events. If (B) is true, no world in which a 
metaphysical (iib) event occurred would be one in which theism was true. 
But either an epistemic or a metaphysical (iib) event would be a theodically 
negative event. Faith is possible in a world in which there are theodically 
negative events. I also suggest that what makes faith possible (as they say, 
in our world) is that it contains theodically neutral events. If (B) is false, one 
could develop the notion of a theodically negative event either in terms of 
reasons to mistakenly think that (B) was true or in other terms. My own view 
is that the notion of a theodically negative event is highly unpromising, but 
of course that goes well beyond the scope of this paper. I will not deal here 
with the question of whether there are other varieties of theistic neutrality, 
or of theistic negativity, though of course their known occurrence might also 
make faith possible. It is worth noting one further feature of theodic neutral-
ity. Such an event, by definition, falls into (i), (ii), and only into (iia) rather 
than falling into (iib) and therefore also into (iia). But any event that fell into 
(i), (ii), and (iib)-and was known to do so-would [if (B) is true] be evidence 
against divine existence. Of course an event might lose its theodic neutrality 
by our coming up with some morally sufficient reason that it is logically 
possible God have for allowing it; it would then be a theodically positive 
event. An event, then, is theodically neutral only if, were it neither theodically 
neutral nor theodically positive, it would provide evidence against the exis-
tence of God. And other modalities of theistic neutrality, if any, presumably 
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will have analogous features. A further word about theodic neutrality is in 
order. What makes faith necessary, and sight impossible, my suggestion is, 
is the known occurrence of theodically neutral events. Such events have a 
feature that we have not yet emphasized, though it is fairly obvious. They 
concern things that we care about-things that do or plausibly might affect 
ourselves and those that we most care about. They not only serve as relevant 
reminders of our dependence and frailty, but also threaten our health and 
happiness. They are the sorts of events that not only are hardest to under-
stand-hardest to see as things a loving God who could prevent them is right 
to allow-but also that may well blight the lives of one's friends, family, or 
self. As such they challenge personal as well as propositional faith; they raise 
a question about the trustworthiness of God as well as raising a question about 
the truth of the monotheistic kernel. In challenging personal as well as prop-
ositional faith, they of course challenge practical faith as well. Perhaps in 
non-monotheistic traditions something similar is requisite. There, perhaps, 
faith is possible only in a context in which, say, people seem to have achieved 
enlightenment and then fall away from their religious tradition, or fall into 
deep depression or wickedness, or follow the recipe faithfully without posi-
tive results. But I have no room to pursue that here. 
Conclusion 
Christian faith, then, is propositional, practical, and personal faith whose 
content is the Christian rational kernel, whose object is God and Christ, and 
which occurs in a world in which there are accessible theodically neutral 
[and/or other theistically neutral] events [or theodically negative events]. 
Other sorts of religious faith can occur only in worlds in which analogously 
neutral [or negative] events are accessible. 
Three Consequences 
If the account of Christian faith offered here is correct, then what does that 
entail? I note three consequences. First, knowingly having a proof that God 
exists, or that it is reasonable to believe that God exists, or that it is more 
probably true than not that God exists, or the like, is not incompatible with 
having faith; it also is not incompatible with not having faith. On this account 
of faith, Thomas can believe because he saw the resurrected Jesus and the 
devils can propositionally believe and tremble. In that sense, faith and reason 
do not conflict. Second, there is no need that the Christian Faith contain 
paradoxes. Paradoxes often are effective teaching devices; but many things 
appear to be contradictions simply because they are, and with such faith need 
have no connection. Third, there is no need that Christian faith be contrary 
to any evidence that we have. Whether a particular instance of faith does so 
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conflict is an empirical matter external to the definition of religious, mono-
theistic, or Christian faith. 
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